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Abstract
The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending
and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its
spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be miti-
gated by different fiscal or constitutional institutions. We distinguish between two variants of
fragmented governments: cabinet size and coalition size. Theoretically, they both describe the
degree to which the costs of spending decisions are internalized by individual decision-makers. In
addition, we evaluate whether constitutional rules for executive and legislation as well as budget
rules shape the size of government and how the different rules interact with fragmentation in de-
termining government size. The empirical study of the role of fragmented governments for fiscal
policy outcomes is based on a panel of the 26 Swiss cantons over the 1980-1998 period. The re-
sults indicate that the number of ministers in the cabinet is negatively associated with fiscal disci-
pline. Furthermore, the fiscal referendum does effectively restrict the fiscal commons problem,
but less successfully than the budget rule.
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Since the 1980s many central governments have problems with fiscal discipline (Tanzi and Schu-
knecht, 2000). But the phenomenon of long-term budget imbalance is not reserved to the national
level only. The same holds for many sub-federal governments. Though average sub-national
deficit accounted for 0.42 percent of GDP in a sample of 63 IMF countries during the period
from 1986 to 1996, in the federalist countries Argentina and Brazil the provinces’ deficits rou-
tinely exceed that of the central government. Furthermore, countries with increasing decentrali-
zation like Mexico or South-Africa
1 have a deficit growth at an alarming rate (Rodden, 2002).
Following the contributions by Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson (1981), such budgetary imbal-
ances are explained by the degree of fragmentation in government. The starting point of that
analysis is the notion that the government budget represents a common pool for all political ac-
tors. These actors seek electoral support from special interest groups in order to be re-elected.
Since each individual group benefits from specific programs of government spending, politicians
are concerned with targeting resources from the public budget to those budget items that benefit
their constituencies. By contrast, the costs of these special expenditure programs are spread over
the whole population, assuming that taxation cannot be as easily targeted to a special segment of
the population as spending programs. Consequently, each interest group and its representative
fully internalize the benefits of the targeted spending programs while they only perceive a frac-
tion, 1/n, of initiated costs. Thus, the number of decision-makers on the public budget is posi-
tively associated with the size of government expenditure. The larger the number of n special
interest groups and their appointed representatives, the smaller the degree to which they internal-
ize the costs of their spending programs. Hence broad based governments tend to have loose fis-
cal discipline. The resulting asymmetry between spending and revenue growth culminates in ris-
ing budget deficits and pushes up debt on all levels of government.
The extent of fiscal imbalance varies however considerably between governments and within
jurisdictions over time. Intuitively, different economic, historical, cultural and geographical con-
ditions are seen as crucial driving forces for these differences. But as contributions in political
economics have found time and again, fiscal policy is extensively determined by the arrangement
of political institutions. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that institutions also shape the fiscal
                                                
1 For a survey of the decentralization tendencies in South-Africa, see Rubinfeld (2001).- 3 -
commons problem. According to Buchanan (1980) we can distinguish procedural and quantita-
tive restrictions. Procedures define how property rights over political decisions are acquired, and
who can exercise them. Independent from partisan effects (Hibbs, 1977; Blais, Blake and Dion,
1993), institutions like electoral and legislative rules (Persson and Tabellini, 2001), the budget
process (Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1999), or possibilities of direct legislation via referendums
and initiatives (Feld and Kirchgässner, 2001) are of importance. The second class of institutions
entails explicit budget rules on the constitutional or statutory level (Poterba, 1997). They are de-
signed to commit policy-makers on specific policy outcomes like the existing spending, taxing,
deficit or debt limitations in the United States, the European Union or Switzerland. (Shadbegian,
1998; de Haan and Sturm, 2000; Danninger, 2002).
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of different procedural and quantitative in-
stitutions on fiscal policy outcomes for the 26 Swiss cantons over the 1980-1998 period. In par-
ticular, we focus on the effect of  majoritarian versus proportional elections, direct legislation,
term limits and budget rules to restrict the fiscal commons problem created by fragmented gov-
ernments. Even though the Swiss sub-federal governments have rather sound public finances,
problems of fiscal imbalance have arisen in several jurisdictions especially during the 1990’s
(Kirchgässner, 2002; Frey, 2002). According to our findings, only fiscal referendums and budget
rules restrict the different spending ministries to overuse the fiscal commons to a significant ex-
tent. Comparing both types of rules, formal fiscal restraints appear to be more successful than
fiscal referendums. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section two, the impact
of fragmented governments on fiscal policy outcomes is discussed while section three addresses
the role of legislative and electoral rules in shaping fiscal policy decisions. Finally, budget rules
are considered as well. The empirical implementation of the impact of all these institutions on
policy outcomes follows in section four. The results will be discussed in section five while sec-
tion six offers some concluding remarks.
2.  Fragmented governments and fiscal policy
The empirical literature uses several concepts of fragmented governments depending on the unit
of decision-making. For instance, the number of sub-federal jurisdictions as well as the number
of interest groups could serve as a test for the fragmentation hypothesis. This paper focuses on
the interpretation of fragmentation in the executive power of government. One line of empirical- 4 -
research uses coalition size as an indicator for government fragmentation. According to the
analyses by Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b), the rationale for this interpretation is that each party in
government rather cohesively represents the interests of a specific pressure group. In a panel re-
gression for 14 OECD-countries over the 1960 to 1985 period, they provide empirical evidence
that large deficits are characterized by a short average tenure of governments and by broad based
coalitions ruling the government. However, in a re-examination of their findings, Edin and Ohls-
son (1991) argue that the Roubini-Sachs cohesion variable captures the effects of minority gov-
ernments rather than majority coalition governments. But in essence, they support the notion that
political cohesion supports government’s ability to fight fiscal imbalance.
2 Much the same can be
concluded from the empirical investigation by Alt and Lowry (1994). Using data from the 48 US
states (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) over the 1968-1987 period, they find that divided govern-
ments are less capable to balance the budget, particularly in the case of different parties having a
majority in the two legislative chambers.
On the other hand, Lijphart and Crepaz (1991) and Crepaz (1996) show that ‘weak’ multiparty
coalition governments face favorable outcomes in unemployment, inflation and the number of
working days lost for 18 industrialized countries over 9 elections per country. Broad-based coali-
tion governments have to follow fiscal policies, which are representative for a huge part of the
population. Thus, and in accordance with the theory by Alesina and Rosenthal (1996), divided
governments are less prone to the threat of minor interest groups. On the basis of these argu-
ments, it can also be argued that the acceptance of policy decisions is higher when they reflect the
preferences of a broad majority of the electorate. This is the case in a consensus democracy.
Another interpretation of fragmented governments refers to the number of spending ministers in
the government as an indicator for government fragmentation. Each spending minister partici-
pates in decisions on spending projects and demands resources from the overall budget. It is de-
bated whether cabinet size should include the head of the ministry of finance and the prime min-
ister. Volkerink and de Haan (2001) argue that finance and prime ministers are generally not con-
cerned with spending administrations but take responsibility for the whole budget. Hence, these
members of the cabinet enjoy a somewhat different position compared to the other ministers.
Using a panel of 22 OECD countries over the 1971-1996 period, they report empirical evidence
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that governments with a high number of spending ministers face higher deficits while govern-
ments with a large majority in parliament have significantly lower deficits. On the other hand,
Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) use the total number of ministers in the cabinet since the influ-
ence of the ministers of finance is often not limited to the overall budget. They also have a large
influence on the selection of specific spending projects. For a panel of 19 OECD countries over
the 1970-1995 period, they report evidence that cabinet size is a robust determinant of the size of
government. Especially, transfer payments are higher in a large cabinet government while i n-
vestment spending remains unaffected by the number of ministers in the cabinet. In turn, the size
of the coalition in charge of government and the ideological position of the government have lit-
tle impact on fiscal outcomes. In a preceding analysis, Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) find that
the number of ministers in the cabinet has a very robust effect on government expenditure while
the number of parties in government seems to be statistically far less robust. Summing up, there
is a lot of evidence that fragmented governments actually create a fiscal commons problem.
3.  Electoral rules and fiscal policy
Another branch of the literature on comparative politics and public finance investigates the ef-
fects of electoral rules and regime types. Electoral rules formulate how votes are transformed into
seats in parliament and take the form of proportional or majoritarian representation. Persson and
Tabellini (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003), Lijphart (1994), Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2000) and Besley and
Case (2003) argue that majoritarian electoral rules are associated with smaller governments. The
theoretical explanation why the electoral formula should matter is twofold: First, under propor-
tional representation, politicians are induced to provide policy benefits to a larger segment of
voters than under majoritarian elections. More groups are participating in overusing the fiscal
commons. Second, proportional elections put emphasis on parties while  majoritarian elections
strengthen the role of candidates in electoral districts eventually fostering political accountability.
Decisive districts are more strongly contested in  majoritarian elections intensifying political
competition while districts are less important in proportional representation systems where party
lists are instrumental for allocating seats in parliament.
Furthermore, Lijphart (1999) provides empirical evidence that majoritarian electoral rules shape
the party structure of a government leading to a smaller number of parties. Moreover, propor-
tional elections favor the creation of coalition governments. Under proportional elections, more- 6 -
veto players are thus involved in policy-making, which, according to Roubini and Sachs (1989a,
b), is the reason why these governments can be categorized as ‘weak’ as compared to ‘strong’
single party governments. As shown by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and empirically supported
by Grilli, Mascandaro and Tabellini (1991), government crisis are indeed more likely und hence
occur more frequently under proportional elections favoring larger budget deficits.
3
The question, how constitutional rules for the executive power shape policy decisions has been
addressed by Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) as well as by Persson and Tabellini (2000,
2001, 2002, 2003). According to their empirical results, presidential regimes generate smaller
government spending than parliamentary regimes. The theoretical argument is again based on the
political accountability of incumbents. In a parliamentary regime, the executive depends on the
confidence vote of a majority in the legislative assembly. This institutional connection between
the executive and the legislative chamber contradicts the principle of a separation of powers and
weakens accountability such that the fiscal commons problem is more widespread. In a presiden-
tial regime the government can maintain power without the support of the parliament fostering
checks and balances and therefore political accountability.
Electoral accountability is not only affected by the government type but also by additional proce-
dural provisions. Assuming that candidates have career concerns and are interested in reputation
building for better reelection prospects, term limits reduce incentives to fight fiscal commons
problems in the last term in office. As term limits exist in roughly half of the US states, they pro-
vide for a natural laboratory to empirically evaluate the hypothesis of reputation-building. In their
empirical analyses, Crain and Tollison (1977, 1993) find that candidates for office are willing to
pay more for the opportunity to serve in a state with a four-year term than in a state with a two-
year term. In a remarkable paper, Besley and Case (1995) present evidence that lame duck gover-
nors in the last gubernatorial term who face term limits spend more and set higher taxes com-
pared to their first gubernatorial term for the 48 continental US states over 1950 to 1986.
Another aspect of legislative rules addresses the provision of some form of direct democracy.
Recently, widespread interest in this type of fiscal institution has emerged (Kirchgässner, Feld
and Savioz, 1999). The possibility of direct legislation is seen as an effective instrument to match
                                                
3 Casual evidence from Switzerland supports this notion: all cantons have majoritarian systems with two excep-
tions (Tessin since 1893 and Zug since 1894) where government crisis seldom occurs (Vatter, 1998).- 7 -
voter preferences and policy outcomes by reducing principal-agent problems of government dis-
cretion in a representative democracy. In addition, the fiscal commons problems may be less se-
vere in referendums because log-rolling is more difficult. Consequently, pork-barrel politics oc-
cur less frequently. Following Peltzman (1992), voters can also be seen as fiscal conservatives
such that direct legislation favors smaller governments. For the US states, Matsusaka (1995) pro-
vides evidence for an expenditure and revenue cutting effect of the voter initiative. He also finds
that the signature requirement to qualify for ballots is negatively associated with the level of gov-
ernment spending. Switzerland provides an even richer experience with different instruments of
direct democracy than the US states including not only the voter initiative to put new aspects on
the political agenda but also the popular referendum with which government decisions can be
vetoed. Feld and Matsusaka (2003) thus use Swiss cantons to reevaluate its impact. Their find-
ings indicate that the expenditure and revenue cutting effect of direct democracy is not a statisti-
cal artifact under North-American circumstances but also holds in the Swiss case. In addition, the
referendum possibility seems to foster smaller governments more effectively than the initiative.
All in all, there is a lot of evidence that electoral rules and regime types shape fiscal policy deci-
sions by governments. However, the effect of these rules on the problems of fiscal commons has
not yet been empirically analyzed to the authors’ knowledge.
4.  Budget rules and fiscal policy
Budget rules represent (more or less exactly) specified policy targets. In contrast to the above
mentioned procedural institutions, formal fiscal restraints are a kind of self-commitment of the
political actors accustomed with the usual outcomes of the decision-making process. The imple-
mentation of budget rules in many jurisdictions dates back to the late 1970’s as an expression of a
broad concern about the sustainability of fiscal policy and as a reaction to persistently excessive
deficits since the early 1970’s. This development indicates that government deficits do not fully
follow the logic of inter-temporal tax smoothing where tax rates are set in order to minimize the
excess burden of taxation across time (Barro, 1979, 1986). According to the contribution by Bu-
chanan and Wagner (1977), persistent government deficits are instead caused by an asymmetry of
incentives in democratic decision-making. The possibility to finance government spending by
bond issuing can be abused by a Leviathan government for own and ideological purposes. With
deficit spending it is also possible to support partial interests while the costs fall on subsequent- 8 -
governments. Formal fiscal restraints are supposed to restrain this fiscal commons problem be-
cause the different constituencies set the spending or deficit targets behind a veil of ignorance
without knowing under what conditions they wish to incur excessive deficits. They bind them-
selves today for possible future situations in which they could otherwise trade votes with com-
peting groups finally leading to an over-use of the fiscal commons. According to Alesina and
Tabellini (1990) and Persson and Svensson (1989), governments in addition have an incentive to
strategically use government debt in order to commit future governments (for an empirical as-
sessment of these hypotheses for 277 Swedish communities, see  Pettersson-Lidbom 2001).
Therefore, to circumvent the democratic bias towards deficit spending, Buchanan (1980), Bren-
nan and Buchanan (1980) as well as Folkers (1983) argue for limits on the discretionary use of
instruments of fiscal policy by governments on the constitutional level.
The impact of budget rules on fiscal outcomes has been analyzed systematically on the state and
local level in the United States, again without explicitly testing whether they restrain the fiscal
commons problem. Tax and Expenditure Limitation Laws (TEL) were mainly introduced during
the tax revolts associated with the passage of California’s Proposition 13. Before 1978, only New
Jersey and Colorado had a binding TEL. Afterwards and until 1987, many other states introduced
TELs (Shadbegian, 1996; p. 23). The study by Shadbegian (1996) shows that there is an expen-
diture cutting effect of TELs on the relative growth of government spending compared to the
growth of national income. The same holds for the local level in the US. Shadbegian (1998) pro-
vides empirical evidence indicating that TELs also have a restricting effect on the size of the lo-
cal public sector. The main impact is on the property tax. Poterba (1996) argues that the effect of
budget rules on fiscal policy should take possible endogeneity into account since the cross-
section variation could also be influenced by different fiscal preferences rather than by the exis-
tence of a TEL. Indeed, Shadbegian (1998) carefully controls for possible endogeneity of the
TELs in his panel study from 1972 to 1992. In a panel study for the 26 Swiss cantons from 1980-
1998, Schaltegger (2002) finds empirical evidence for the Swiss cantons that budget rules mainly
restrict deficit spending by also controlling for possible endogeneity.- 9 -





















Term limits of mem-
bers of parliament (#
Years)
Zurich 7 5 180
Bern 9 / 7 (1989) 3 200 (160 as of 2006)
Luzern 7 / 5 (2003) 3 120 (170 until 1999)
Uri 7 X 3 64
Schwyz 7 3 16 100
Obwalden 7 / 5 (2002) until 2002 2 / 3 16 55 16
Nidwalden 9 / 7 (1997) 2 60
Glarus 7 / 5 (2006) until 2006 4 16 80
Zug 7 3 X 80
Fribourg 7 3 / 5 / 4 X 16 130
Solothurn 5 3 X 144 (100 as of 2005)
Basel-Stadt 7 5 / 4 130 12
Basel-Landschaft 5 4 / 3 90 16
Schaffhausen 5 3 80
Appenzell a. Rh. 7 4 / 3 X 16 65 X
Appenzell i. Rh. 9 / 7 (1995) X 1 46 X
St. Gallen 7 3 X 180
Graubünden 5 3 X 12 120 X
Aargau 5 4 200 (140 as of 2005)
Thurgau 5 4 130
Tessin 5 3 / 4 X 90
Waadt 7 4 / 5 180 (200 until 1997)
Wallis 5 2 130
Neuchatel 5 3 115
Genf 7 4 16 100
Jura 5 3 16 60 12
Note: Year of institutional change in brackets; Source: see Appendix- 10 -
5.  Empirical implementation
In order to evaluate first the impact of fragmented governments on fiscal policy and second
the influence of institutions on restricting the fiscal commons problem, a panel regression
analysis for the Swiss cantons is performed. The Swiss cantons have considerable spending
and taxing autonomy as well as a rich institutional variety. They can therefore serve as a natu-
ral laboratory for such an empirical investigation (Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger, 2003).
The annual panel covers the period 1980 to 1998, deflated to the year 1980, and all 26 can-
tons. Detailed information concerning the two variables capturing measures of government
fragmentation can be found in Table 1. The number of ministers in the cantonal cabinets var-
ies between five and seven. Moreover, the cantons Berne (1989), Appenzell i. Rh. (1995), and
Nidwalden (1997) have changed from nine to seven ministers in the executive body. Recently,
the canton Obwalden reduced his cabinet from seven to five ministers and, due to a successful
voter initiative in the canton Lucerne, its cabinet counts five members since July 2003. Voters
of the canton Glarus have decided to reduce the size of cabinet from seven to five ministers
effective as of 2006 on their town meeting in 2004. It has to be considered, however, that
some of the cantons engage their governors only part-time. This particularly holds for smaller
cantons. The column with the number of parties represented in the government also shows
some variation across cantons, even though broad coalitions represent the normal case. Fur-
thermore, as shown by Vatter (1998), the ideological position of cantonal governments is very
persistent over time.
The cantonal parliaments have also very different sizes in terms of members of parliament.
The size ranges from 46 members in Appenzell i.Rh. to 200 members in Berne and Aargau.
Recently, some cantons have reduced their size of parliament like Lucerne (1999) and Vaud
(1997). In Berne and Solothurn, the legislative body will be reduced after the next elections
according to successfully approved voter initiatives. Concerning electoral rules, the Swiss
cantons have majoritarian elections with two exceptions (Tessin and Zug) for the executive
and proportional elections with three exceptions (Graubünden, Appenzell i.Rh. and Appenzell
a.Rh.) for parliament. As all cantonal governments are directly elected by voters, there does
not exist a variation in the regime type across the state level in Switzerland (Vatter, 1998).
Most cantonal constitutions do not make use of term limits. However, eight out of 26 cantons
restrict the maximum time span for governors to three or four gubernatorial terms. For mem-
bers of cantonal parliaments, term limits are applied in four cantons only.- 11 -
Additionally, the cantons reveal a rich variety of referendum possibilities. Some cantons use a
mandatory budget referendum with different spending thresholds to qualify for ballots. Others
apply the optional form of the budget referendum with spending thresholds and signature re-
quirements differing from canton to canton (Feld and Matsusaka, 2003). Some cantons (St.
Gallen, Solothurn, Appenzell i.Rh., Fribourg and Graubünden)
4 additionally have statutory
requirements to balance the budget. These budget rules are aimed at reducing the discretion-
ary use of deficit spending (Stauffer, 2001; Schaltegger, 2002 and Kirchgässner, 2002). Such
restraints usually are observed in cantons that have provisions for fiscal referendums. They
force the cantons to increase tax rates if budget deficits surpass a deficit threshold. In  Fri-
bourg, this requirement is specified such that local taxes are not covered, but a bailout of the
cantonal by the local level is highly improbable. The cantons of St. Gallen and Solothurn have
additional restrictions on tax rate cuts that provide additional restrictions on deficit financing.
The requirements are less restrictive in Appenzell a.Rh. and in Graubünden.
Using this institutional variety, we propose the following econometric model to analyze the
role of government fragmentation and different political and fiscal rules for public finances:
Xit = a + b CTRLit +z POLITICAL_INSTITUIONSit + TDt + eit (1)
where i are the canton and t the year indices, respectively. X represents the budget variables,
i.e. public spending, revenue, deficit or debt. All dependent variables are calculated in loga-
rithms with the exception of the deficit variable, which is calculated in nominal values. CTRL
is a vector of control variables (received grants, national income, population size, urban share
of population, number of communes within a canton, and a dummy variable taking the value
1 for German speaking cantons). The vector POLITICAL_INSTITUTIONS captures the num-
ber of ministers in a specific cantonal government, whether a minister is working part-time or
not, the number of parties governing a canton, a dummy-variable = 1 for those cantons that
have a specific statutory requirement to balance the cantonal budget, a dummy variable = 1
for those cantons with a mandatory fiscal referendum as well as a variable measuring the
spending thresholds applied to the mandatory fiscal referendum. Finally, TD is a set of time
dummies controlling for year specific effects whereas e represents the error term of the re-
gression. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables in the empirical analysis.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Expenditures 4217 1666 2274 10938
Revenue 4126 1560 2264 10768
Deficit 91 284 -1630 1758
Debt 3738 2643 795 16820
Cabinet size 6.39 1.22 5 9
Coalition size 3.25 0.86 1 5
Part time governors 0.31 0.46 0 1
Parliament size 115 48 46 200
Prop. election government 0.08 0.27 0 1
Maj. election parliament 0.12 0.32 0 1
Term limits government 0.31 0.46 0 1
Term limits parliament 0.15 0.36 0 1
Fiscal referendum 0.69 0.46 0 1
Threshold 12 17 0 85
Budget rule 0.26 0.71 0 3
Grants 1100 688 328 4152
Cantonal income 25891 5754 17707 53997
Population 258519 271072 12757 1183570
Urban 0.31 0.24 0 0.99
Communes 115 113 3 412
German language 0.73 0.44 0 1
Note: Financial figures are displayed in 1980 Swiss Francs.
The basic equations are first estimated by OLS. The consistency of the estimated coefficients
depends however on the exogeneity of the regressands. In our case, this is not unproblematic
since the size of the cabinet, the coalition size and the budget rules could be the result of dif-
ferent fiscal preferences between the cantons. For example, the reduction of the cabinet size
could just be an expression of electoral preferences to cut down government spending. In this
case, we can find a negative impact of a reduction of the cabinet size on government expen-
ditures, though there is a reversed causality. The same problem applies to coalition size and
budget rules (Poterba 1996). In order to tackle the endogeneity problem of the three variables,
we apply an instrumental-variable estimation. The presented IV-estimates use the cantonal
fixed effects as instruments. The subsequent estimation strategy is to first estimate the basic
econometric model as outlined above by OLS and IV. In the second step, the robustness of
these estimation results to the inclusion of additional institutional factors is checked. Third,
only those institutional rules that turn out to have significant impacts of fiscal policy out-
comes are interacted with the main fiscal commons variable in order to have an explicit test of













Size of cabinet and government finances, 1980-1998  
per capita average  3792  4696  3714  4585  3236  4255  78  118 
Spending (5) Spending (7/9)  Revenue (5)  Revenue (7/9)  Debts (5)  Debts (7/9)  Deficits (5)  Deficits (7/9) 
6.  Results
In order to illustrate the effect of cabinet size on the size of government at the outset, we first
compare the budgetary policy choices that have been made in a cabinet with five ministers
with the policy decisions by cabinets with seven (nine) ministers. Figure 1 indicates that
smaller cabinets appear to favor smaller governments. This is true for government spending,
which is reduced by nearly 1000 Swiss Francs per capita when 5 ministers govern the canton
instead of seven (nine) as well as for government revenue, deficits and debts. Table 3 shows
the longitudinal effect of a change in the size of cabinet. In our period of observation there is
only one canton, which is apt for such an investigation. The canton of Bern changed the size
of cabinet in 1989 from nine to seven ministers. Therefore, we have nearly a ten year period
before the institutional change took place and a period of about the same length after the re-
duction of the size of the cabinet. As indicated in Table 3 in the case of Berne, there is a con-
siderable decline of the spending growth after the introduction of a smaller cabinet. Moreover,
compared to the average Swiss canton, Berne could cut back its spending growth from a level
much above the average between 1980 to 1989 to a level somewhat below the average be-
tween 1989 to 1998. Very much the same can be concluded when observing the spending
growth of some neighboring cantons, which have a common border with Bern.
Figure 1: Cabinet size and fiscal policy
Source: Own calculations
Of course, the descriptive evidence of smaller governments in jurisdictions governed by
smaller cabinets can have many unobserved reasons. Therefore, a whole set of other explana-
tory variables for budget decisions are included in order to see the differential impact of cabi-- 14 -
net size on the size of government. They can be broadly distinguished into economic and so-
cio-demographic control variables, into political variables and into other institutional vari-
ables (see Table 2). Table 4 displays the results of the OLS as well as of the IV regressions.
Table 3: Development of expenditures before and after change in cabinet size of Bern
Canton Bern Average Swiss
canton
Vaud Solothurn Fribourg Luzern
Average spending growth
before change in cabinet
size of Bern (1980 to 1989)
2.534 % 1.735 % 2.502 % 2.026 % 1.288 % 0.722 %
Average spending growth
after change in cabinet
size of Bern (1989 to 1998)
1.759 % 1.813 % 1.764 % 3.874 % 3.071 % 3.291 %
Difference of spending
growth
-0.775 % 0.077 % -0.737 % 1.848 % 1.783 % 2.569 %
Source: Own calculations
The most interesting result is found for the fragmentation variables: Cabinet size shows the
predicted positive and significant sign for public expenditure and revenue in the OLS regres-
sions as well as in the IV regressions. As can be seen by the coefficients, an increasing cabinet
size by one additional minister leads to between 5 and 6 percent higher public spending or
revenues. Although the differences between the effects of cabinet size on spending and reve-
nue are not important, deficits are significantly higher in cantons with larger cabinets while
debt does not appear to be significantly affected. Interestingly, the second variable capturing
the effects of fragmented governments is not performing similarly well. In comparison to
cabinet size, coalition size has a smaller quantitative effect on the public budget than the
number of spending ministers. The estimated coefficients are also only marginally or not sig-
nificant in most cases. Thus, it is immediately apparent that the number of ministers in the
cabinet is an important determinant of fiscal outcomes. The obtained results are in line with
those by Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) for a panel of OECD countries.
Looking at Table 4, other interesting results can be observed. For example, some cantons
have governments with executives that are engaged only part-time. If a government relies on
part-time governors this has a significant and robust spending and revenue cutting effect by
approximately 24 to 26 percent. It also significantly reduces public debt and budget deficits.
In line with previous empirical studies (Feld and Kirchgässner, 2001), the results confirm that
the mandatory fiscal referendum favors significantly smaller government spending and reve-
nue by about 10 percent. In the case of public debt, direct legislation reduces accumulated
deficits significantly by a similar amount. The spending thresholds do however not have any
significant impact on cantonal public finances. On the other hand, budget rules do not play a- 15 -
very prominent role in fostering fiscal discipline in our case. This result indicates that proce-
dural aspects like the cabinet size and possibilities of direct legislation defining how property
rights in politics are distributed and how they can be exercised are, at first sight, more effec-
tive in fostering sounder public finances than self-commitments by the government in form of
quantitative restrictions. The economic control variables exhibit the expected impacts al-
though income, regional fragmentation in communities and the language dummy do also not
have any significant impact. There is an exception however: Fragmentation and the language
dummy belong to the few variables influencing budget deficits of the cantons. These are sig-
nificantly lower in German speaking and in more fragmented cantons.
Table 4: OLS and IV regressions for cantonal fiscal policy decisions, 26 Swiss cantons, 1980-1998
Variables Log Expenditure Log Revenue Log Debt Deficit per cap.
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Cabinet size 0.052*** 0.058*** 0.050*** 0.055*** 0.057 0.065 45.1** 49.3**
(3.34) (3.40) (3.29) (3.33) (1.58) (1.70) (2.22) (2.18)
Part time -0.243*** -0.258*** -0.236*** -0.250*** -0.337*** -0.358*** -159.6** -170.5**
(-4.25) (4.48) (-4.26) (-4.45) (-2.95) (-3.07) (-2.63) (-2.64)
Coalition size 0.039* 0.041** 0.037* 0.038* 0.001 0.004 26.5 27.8
(2.00) (2.09) (1.90) (1.98) (0.05) (0.13) (1.18) (1.25)
Budget rule -0.007 -0.008 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.029 -0.031 -66.6* -67.4
(0.54) (0.59) (0.03) (-0.12) (-0.77) (0.79) (-1.72) (-1.70)
Budget referendum -0.097*** -0.101*** -0.108*** -0.111*** -0.096** -0.101** 53.92 51.5
(-4.74) (-5.05) (-5.56) (-5.76) (-2.20) (-2.21) (1.16) (1.14)
Threshold¤ -0.451 -0.558 -0.466 -0.565 0.268 0.121 -394.4 -471.4
(-0.63) (-0.76) (-0.66) (-0.78) (0.23) (0.10) (-0.48) (-0.56)
Grants¤ 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.050*** 0.050** 9.8 10.1
(7.73) (7.65) (7.92) (7.85) (2.87) (2.75) (0.66) (0.66)
Income 0.114 0.106 0.124 0.117 -0.035 -0.045 -11.0 -16.6
(0.86) (0.82) (0.92) (0.89) (-0.13) (-0.17) (-0.13) (-0.19)
Population -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.116** -0.116** 34.9 34.7
(-4.20) (-4.27) (-4.63) (-4.71) (-2.32) (-2.28) (0.96) (0.95)
Urban 0.189** 0.175* 0.182** 0.169* 0.544*** 0.524*** 89.7 79.6
(2.17) (1.75) (2.15) (1.97) (3.50) (3.33) (0.97) (0.78)
Communes¤ -0.079 -0.109 -0.046 -0.074 -0.163 -0.203 -616.7* -638.1*
(-0.38) (-0.51) (-0.23) (0.36) (-0.33) (-0.40) (-1.80) (-1.92)
German language -0.006 -0.004 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.010 -144.9** -143.4**
(-0.19) (-0.14) (0.15) (0.21) (0.11) (0.16) (-2.30) (-2.30)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494
R
2 0.833 0.832 0.834 0.833 0.585 0.585 0.420 0.420
Note: Instruments for IV-Regression are all regressors with exception of minister-variable and 26 cantonal intercepts.
¤10^3 for readability
Population size has a significantly negative influence, the urban variable has a significantly
positive impact on spending, revenue and debt. Finally, grants are significantly positive in the
spending, revenue and debt equations. Overall the explanatory power of the estimated models- 16 -
is relatively high. In the next step, we regress the same model on the cantonal means of (the
log of) spending, revenue, debt and deficits, and perform sensitivity analyses by introducing
additional political and institutional control variables. These consist of the number of seats in
the cantonal parliament, two dummy-variables = 1 for those cantons that impose term limits
(executive and legislative), dummy-variables = 1 for majoritarian electoral rules (executive
and legislative), and executive and legislative ideology of canton governments. Finally, these
variables are included together in one equation.

















Cabinet size 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.053*** 0.065*** 0.053*** 0.059***
(3.13) (3.40) (3.52) (3.74) (4.51) (3.25) (4.59)
Part time -0.266*** -0.258*** -0.260*** -0.236*** -0.320*** -0.218*** -0.254***
(-3.48) (4.48) (-4.41) (-4.39) (-5.01) (-3.42) (-3.72)
Coalition size 0.053* 0.041** 0.041** 0.037** 0.035** 0.031* 0.028*
(2.07) (2.09) (2.08) (2.15) (2.14) (1.76) (1.92)
Budget rule -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.015 -0.004 -0.003
(0.34) (0.59) (-0.44) (-0.52) (-0.87) (-0.35) (-0.20)
Budget referendum -0.112*** -0.101*** -0.102*** -0.110*** -0.133*** -0.103*** -0.156***
(-2.34) (-5.05) (-5.10) (-4.69) (-5.05) (-3.78) (-5.21)
Threshold¤ -0.578 -0.558 -0.439 -0.416 -0.807 0.179 0.190
(-0.52) (-0.76) (-0.62) (-0.60) (-1.22) (0.20) (0.23)
Seats in parliament -0.001 -0.001
(-0.91) (-0.85)
Prop. election gov. 0.058 -0.049
(-0.75) (-0.66)
Maj. Election parl. 0.029 0.002
(0.93) (0.05)
Term limits (gov.) 0.061** 0.055*
(2.42) (1.96)
Term limits (parl.) -0.043 -0.049
(-1.34) (-1.35)
Ideology gov. -0.021 -0.001
(-1.27) (-0.05)
Ideology parl. 0.209 0.273***
(1.52) (2.79)
Time effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 494 494 494 494 494 494 494
R
2 0.755 0.832 0.834 0.843 0.852 0.847 0.873
Note: Instruments for IV-Regression are all regressors with exception of minister-variable and 26 cantonal inter-
cepts. ¤10^3 for readability. Estimations include all other variables of Table 4, too.
While the regression on cantonal means is performed employing OLS due to the lack of a
convincing instrument, the other sensitivity analyses are estimated by IV. The regressions for
spending are presented in Table 5, the revenue estimates in Table 6, debt in Table 7 and defi-- 17 -
cits in Table 8. We only report estimation results for the most important variables leaving the
results for the control variables unconsidered in the Tables.

















Cabinet size 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.052*** 0.062*** 0.051*** 0.059***
(3.10) (3.33) (3.49) (3.80) (4.56) (3.17) (4.90)
Part time -0.258*** -0.250*** -0.252*** -0.235*** -0.313*** -0.212*** -0.254***
(-3.48) (-4.45) (-4.37) (-4.32) (-5.20) (-3.39) (-3.91)
Coalition size 0.051* 0.038* 0.039* 0.036* 0.034** 0.030 0.028*
(2.04) (1.98) (1.97) (2.03) (2.06) (1.70) (1.98)
Budget rule -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.008 0.003 0.003
(-0.08) (-0.12) (0.08) (-0.11) (-0.56) (0.33) (0.25)
Budget referendum -0.122** -0.111*** -0.112*** -0.119*** -0.144*** -0.113*** -0.167***
(-2.58) (-5.76) (-5.80) (-5.47) (-5.53) (-4.26) (-5.76)
Threshold¤ -0.539 -0.565 -0.437 -0.479 -0.813 0.117 0.087
(-0.50) (-0.78) (-0.63) (-0.71) (-1.24) (0.13) (0.11)
Seats in parliament -0.001 -0.001
(-0.99) (-0.98)
Prop. election gov. -0.047 -0.040
(-0.61) (-0.56)
Maj. Election parl. 0.034 0.008
(1.10) (0.24)
Term limits (gov.) 0.060** 0.055**
(2.59) (2.11)
Term limits (parl.) -0.047 -0.052
(-1.52) (-1.55)
Ideology gov. 0.197 0.272***
(1.46) (2.90)
Ideology parl. -0.019 0.003
(1.20) (0.22)
Time effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 494 494 494 494 494 494 494
R
2 0.783 0.833 0.836 0.843 0.855 0.847 0.875
Note: Instruments for IV-Regression are all regressors with exception of minister-variable and 26 cantonal inter-
cepts. ¤10^3 for readability. Estimations include all other variables of Table 4, too.
Considering first the regressions on the cantonal means, the estimation results remain sur-
prisingly robust. This holds with respect to cabinet size, which exerts a slightly increased im-
pact on spending, revenue, debt and deficits without obtaining any conventional significance
level in the latter two cases however. It also holds for part-time ministers and coalition size as
well as for budget rules and the budget referendum. Contrary to the findings of Besley and
Case (2003), the impact of institutional variables that has been found in previous studies re-
mains robust in the regressions on the cantonal means for the Swiss cantons.- 18 -
Second, a natural objection to the conclusion that cabinet size matters in Swiss cantonal fi-
nances is that budget decisions are much more shaped by the parliament than by the govern-
ment executives. However, since the cantonal governments are directly elected by the elector-
ate and do not depend on parliamentary support in order to be re-elected, they can be catego-
rized as presidential regimes. Following Persson and Tabellini (2001) and their main hypothe-
sis on checks and balances, presidential regimes favor sounder public finances since they do
not depend on the support of the parliament.

















Cabinet size 0.063 0.065 0.074** 0.054 0.078** 0.058 0.062*
(1.60) (1.70) (2.06) (1.53) (2.22) (1.56) (2.05)
Part time -0.357** -0.358*** -0.368*** -0.314** -0.475*** -0.315** -0.333**
(-2.29) (-3.07) (-3.13) (-2.75) (-3.64) (-2.30) (-2.49)
Coalition size 0.003 0.004 0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.010 -0.001
(0.06) (0.13) (0.19) (-0.12) (-0.21) (-0.31) (-0.02)
Budget rule -0.034 -0.031 -0.022 -0.029 -0.044 -0.026 0.001
(-0.64) (0.79) (-0.61) (-0.76) (-0.96) (-0.69) (0.04)
Budget referendum -0.082 -0.101** -0.107** -0.120** -0.162** -0.096* -0.237***
(-0.83) (-2.21) (-2.51) (-2.52) (-2.39) (-1.71) (-3.40)
Threshold¤ -0.330 0.121 0.612 0.423 -0.342 1.097 2.108
(0.15) (0.10) (0.53) (0.37) (-0.29) (0.76) (1.47)
Seats in parliament -0.002** -0.004***
(-2.48) (-3.00)
Prop. election gov. -0.118 -0.253*
(-0.79) (-1.80)
Maj. Election parl. 0.055 -0.049
(0.80) (-0.70)
Term limits (gov.) 0.112** 0.058
(2.42) (1.13)
Term limits (parl.) -0.085 -0.147
(-0.91) (-1.59)
Ideology gov. 0.218 0.218
(0.79) (0.87)
Ideology parl. -0.040 0.027
(-1.27) (0.96)
Time effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 494 494 494 494 494 494 494
R
2 0.522 0.585 0.604 0.602 0.614 0.598 0.670
Note: Instruments for IV-Regression are all regressors with exception of minister-variable and 26 cantonal inter-
cepts. ¤10^3 for readability. Estimations include all other variables of Table 4, too.
Thus, and in order to control for the effect of parliamentary power on budget decisions, we
additionally include the parliament size of the cantonal legislatures in our regressions. Inter-
estingly, there is no systematic effect of the size of parliament on government spending and- 19 -
revenue decisions, which additionally supports our conclusions that the cabinet size is a cru-
cial element in determining fiscal policy choices.
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Table 8: Sensitivity analysis for cantonal deficits per capita, 26 Swiss cantons, 1980-1998
















Cabinet size 50.377 49.256** 48.728* 29.368 56.281** 43.505** 37.344
(1.65) (2.18) (1.95) (1.20) (2.27) (2.17) (1.42)
Part time -178.134 -170.521** -169.790** -95.579 -223.216** -122.806 -155.393
(-1.48) (-2.64) (-2.56) (-1.24) (-2.18) (-1.70) (-1.40)
Coalition size 24.880 27.760 27.636 15.623 9.677 15.274 -10.247
(0.62) (1.25) (1.24) (0.62) (0.38) (0.52) (-0.34)
Budget rule -66.513 -67.440 -67.878* -58.667 -76.603 -61.856* -67.726
(-1.63) (-1.70) (-1.73) (-1.50) (-1.65) (-1.72) (-1.48)
Fiscal referendum 49.267 51.460 51.834 31.465 29.028 50.300 12.149
(0.65) (1.14) (1.11) (0.64) (0.61) (1.07) (0.25)
Threshold¤ -834.498 -471.415 -494.076 189.558 -756.187 474.145 474.638
(-0.48) (-0.56) (-0.57) (0.21) (-0.98) (0.46) (0.41)
Seats in parliament 0.092 0.452
(0.09) (0.36)
Prop. election gov. -145.045*** -63.723
(-2.93) (-0.76)
Maj. Election parl. -31.694 -83.144
(-0.54) (-1.10)
Term limits (gov.) 84.134 100.958
(1.41) (1.53)
Term limits (parl.) 5.711 -23.178
(0.09) (-0.30)
Ideology gov. 257.669 227.904
(0.99) (0.81)
Ideology parl. -30.569 -35.560
(-0.88) (-1.11)
Time effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 494 494 494 494 494 494 494
R
2 0.158 0.420 0.420 0.431 0.431 0.426 0.446
Note: Instruments for IV-Regression are all regressors with exception of minister-variable and 26 cantonal intercepts.
¤10^3 for readability. Estimations include all other variables of Table 4, too.
Referring to the notion that majoritarian electoral rules shape policy decisions towards more
fiscal discipline (Persson and Tabellini, 2001), there is hardly any support observable in the
case of Swiss public finances. In the case of cantonal budget deficits, the proportional election
of the government significantly reduces deficit financing without remaining robust when ad-
ditional institutional variables are controlled for. In the debt table, proportional election of the
government is exclusively having a marginally significant negative effect on cantonal debt
when additional institutions are considered.
                                                
5 Contrary to our hypothesis, parliament size is negatively associated with cantonal debts.- 20 -
Table 9a: Non-linear IV regressions for cantonal fiscal policy decisions, 26 Swiss cantons, 1980-1998
Variables Log Expenditure Log Revenue Log Debt Deficit
IV IV IV IV
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cabinet size 0.058* 0.048 0.079 165.945***
(1.84) (1.55) (1.20) (3.45)
Fiscal referendum -0.006 -0.003 -0.023 -137.729***
* Cabinet Size (-0.23) (-0.12) (-0.41) (-2.85)
Part time -0.244*** -0.237*** -0.341*** -151.117**
(-4.25) (-4.28) (-2.99) (-2.38)
Coalition size 0.039* 0.037* 0.002 29.065
(2.01) (1.90) (0.08) (1.42)
Budget rule -0.008 -0.000 -0.032 -81.616**
(-0.57) (-0.01) (-0.86) (-2.49)
Fiscal referendum -0.063 -0.125 0.031 828.496***
(-0.43) (-0.88) (0.10) (3.29)
Threshold¤ -0.469 -0.473 0.207 -543.176
(-0.65) (-0.66) (0.18) (-0.66)
R
2 0.833 0.834 0.585 0.442
F-Tests 27.235*** 33.328*** 4.060*** 4.413***
Panel B
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Cabinet size 0.068*** 0.063*** 0.094** 81.605***
(3.44) (3.16) (2.54) (3.73)
Budget Rule -0.024** -0.174 -0.069** -78.372***
* Cabinet Size (-2.32) (-1.63) (-2.55) (-4.65)
Part time -0.274*** -0.262*** -0.404*** -221.284***
(-4.64) (-4.43) (-3.71) (-3.84)
Coalition size 0.046** 0.042** 0.019 44.850**
(2.34) (2.11) (0.65) (2.22)
Budget rule 0.136** 0.102* 0.381** 400.980***
(2.47) (1.81) (2.72) (4.56)
Fiscal referendum -0.103*** -0.112*** -0.106** 45.451
(-5.23) (-5.87) (-2.27) (1.01)
Threshold¤ -0.640 -0.625 -0.107 -0.720
(-0.82) (-0.82) (-0.09) (-0.78)
R
2 0.840 0.837 0.619 0.450
F-Tests 32.570*** 39.343*** 7.110*** 5.523***
Note: Instruments for IV-Regression are all regressors with exception of minister-variable and 26 cantonal
intercepts. ¤10^3 for readability
Since only three cantons do not have majoritarian electoral rules, the variation in the sample is
probably too small to draw serious inferences however. On the other hand, term limits for
cantonal governors significantly and robustly increase spending and revenue while term limits
for members of the cantonal parliament have essentially no effect on public finances. The
impact of term limits of the government members on public debt is not robust when control-
ling for other institutional variables. This is somewhat in contrast to results obtained by- 21 -
Besley and Case (1995), who find consistent negative effects of term limits for state gover-
nors for US states.
Finally, the ideological position of the government does not consistently affect public f i-
nances in Swiss cantons although there is a significantly positive impact on cantonal revenue
when controlling for other institutional variables. This reflects the fact that there exists hardly
any canton with single party governments where fiscal policy can follow an ideological posi-
tion. Very much the same holds for the share of leftist parties in the cantonal parliament,
which has a significant but not robust spending expanding effect. More importantly, the inclu-
sion of these different political and institutional variables does not affect the impacts of the
main variables of interest, in particular of cabinet size on cantonal public finances. These im-
pacts are hence robust to additional control variables.
The final investigation is concerned with potential non-linearities. Table 9 indicates the IV
estimates of the familiar variables of interest. Panel A of Table 9a additionally includes an
interaction term of the fiscal referendum and cabinet size. Though the overall effect of fiscal
referendums and of cabinet size remains significant according to the F-tests (only the latter is
shown in the Table), there is no significant interaction effect in the case of spending, revenue
and debt although the interaction term has a negative sign. This indicates that fiscal referen-
dums reduce the problem of fiscal commons, but this effect is statistically not secured. In the
case of cantonal budget deficits, an interesting result emerges, however. Cabinet size now
becomes significantly positive showing that the fiscal commons problem emerges for budget
deficits in those cantons without fiscal referendums, while the significantly negative interac-
tion term indicates a reduction of the fiscal commons problem in deficits for cantons with
fiscal referendums. In cantons with fiscal referendums, but small cabinet sizes, significantly
higher deficits can be found.
The same procedure is repeated with budget rules. In Panel B of Table 9a, an interaction term
of the budget rule variable and cabinet size is additionally included. With the exception of
public debt, where the interaction term of budget rules and cabinet size falls short of statistical
significance, this interaction term is significantly negative in all other equations. Cabinet size
keeps its significantly positive impact in all four equations. This indicates that budget rules
are able to significantly reduce the fiscal commons problem in the case of spending, debt and
deficits while the fiscal commons problem remains valid in the cantons without budget rules.- 22 -
Table 9b: Non-linear IV regressions for cantonal fiscal policy decisions, 26 Swiss cantons, 1980-1998
Variables Log Expenditure Log Revenue Log Debt Deficit
IV IV IV IV
Panel C
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cabinet size 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.055 55.008**
(4.51) (4.35) (1.42) (2.57)
Term Limits 0.057** 0.058** 0.132* 11.564
* Cabinet Size (2.26) (2.33) (1.87) (0.28)
Part time -0.338*** -0.329*** -0.525*** -236.300**
(-5.31) (-5.58) (-4.55) (-2.39)
Coalition size 0.021 0.019 -0.036 8.471
(1.49) (1.33) (-1.33) (0.30)
Budget rule -0.019 -0.012 -0.052 -77.748
(-1.04) (-0.78) (-1.19) (-1.69)
Term Limits -0.313* -0.320* -0.742 12.181
(-1.99) (-2.03) (-1.63) (0.05)
Fiscal referendum -0.104*** -0.113*** -0.101** 29.062
(-5.17) (-5.85) (-2.38) (0.71)
Threshold¤ -0.646 -0.644 0.041 -0.748
(-1.05) (-1.05) (0.00) (-1.03)
R
2 0.866 0.869 0.645 0.431
F-Tests 32.555*** 33.609*** 9.363*** 2.764*
Panel D
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Cabinet size 0.200 0.200* -0.091 151.861
(1.70) (1.83) (-0.33) (0.59)
Cabinet Size -0.011 -0.011 0.012 -7.621
Squared (-1.25) (-1.36) (0.59) (-0.43)
Part time -0.296*** -0.288*** -0.317** -197.909*
(-4.65) (-4.82) (-2.45) (-1.83)
Coalition size 0.029 0.027 0.016 19.541
(1.52) (1.40) (0.48) (0.69)
Budget rule -0.016 -0.009 -0.022 -73.154
(-0.89) (-0.63) (-0.63) (-1.52)
Fiscal referendum -0.095*** -0.105*** -0.107** 55.395
(-4.69) (-5.27) (-2.46) (1.28)
Threshold¤ -0.961 -0.974 0.562 -0.762
(-1.30) (-1.33) (0.46) (-0.77)
R
2 0.843 0.845 0.580 0.421
F-Tests 20.481*** 20.392*** 3.628** 2.303
Note: Instruments for IV-Regression are all regressors with exception of minister-variable and 26 cantonal
intercepts. ¤10^3 for readability
The imposition of term limits exacerbates the fiscal commons problem however. As Panel C
of Table 9b shows, the interaction term of cabinet size and term limits of the government is
significantly positive in the spending, revenue and debt equations. Again the baseline expan-
sionary effect of cabinet size remains significant in almost all fiscal policy equations. Term- 23 -
limits add to this baseline effect. Finally, the IV estimates in Panel D  of Table 9b contain
cabinet size squared in order to investigate a potential optimum of cabinet size. Since cabinet
size and its squared term are not individually significant in any of the four regressions, we ab-
stain from determining that optimum and from putting too much emphasis on it. In all regres-
sions, the control variables remain relatively robust. This holds for the institutional variables
in those equations where they are not used in interaction terms, but also for the economic and
socio-demographic control variables not shown in Table 9 (but available on request).
7.  Conclusion
This paper has focused on the question: do large cabinets favor large governments? Recent
theoretical as well as empirical analyses have shown that the role of fragmented governments
is crucial in explaining fiscal choices by many national governments. We use data from sub-
federal jurisdictions, which allow us to evaluate whether the theory of fragmented govern-
ments finds a more general support for fiscal policy decisions. Furthermore, our sample of
observations is rather homogenous so that the problem is mitigated that tastes and preferences
may explain differences between countries more than differences within a country. We focus
on two different aspects of government fragmentation: the role of coalition size and the role of
cabinet size. The novelty of this paper is twofold: first, our data set on Swiss cantons allows
for comparing the impact of fragmented governments with many other institutional aspects
that have proved to be important in explaining fiscal policy choices, e.g. direct legislation,
budget rules, ideology, term limits, part-time government, electoral rules and other institu-
tions that shape budget decisions. Second, we are able to include interaction effects of some
of these institutional variables and cabinet size in order to test whether and which particular
institutions are most successful in reducing the danger of the fiscal commons problem.
In a panel regressions for the 26 Swiss cantons over the 1980-1998 period, we provide em-
pirical evidence that larger cabinets favor by about 5 to 6 percent larger governments in the
case of per capita spending and per capita revenue. On the other hand, coalition size does not
have such robust effects on the size of government. These results are robust for different
specifications and different estimation procedures. There is only weak evidence that fiscal
referendums are able to restrict the fiscal commons problem in the case of budget deficits.
There is however strong evidence that formal fiscal restraints are most successful in restrain-
ing the fiscal commons problem. Moreover, term limits exacerbate fiscal commons problems
and are thus counterproductive. Despite all the evidence found in the literature on fiscal policy
differences between presidential/parliamentarian systems, proportional representation/  ma-- 24 -
joritarian elections and direct/representative democracy, formal fiscal restraints play a crucial
role in at least partly solving fiscal commons problems. This is also a residual explanation of
why citizens in some Swiss cantons have deliberately accepted or introduced budget rules
despite the fact that they can already use the instrument of fiscal referendums to restrict fiscal
policies.
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Appendix
Table A: Data description
Variable name Description Source
Expenditure Real total expenditure per capita Swiss Federal Finance Administration
Revenue Real total revenue per capita Swiss Federal Finance Administration
Deficits Real total deficits per capita Swiss Federal Finance Administration
Debts Real total debts per capita Swiss Federal Finance Administration
Cabinet size Number of ministers in the cantonal cabinet anneé politique suisse
Coalition Number of parties in the cantonal cabinet anneé politique suisse
Part time Dummy = 1 for cantonal cabinets engaging part
time governors
Own investigations
Maj. government Dummy = 1 for cantons with majoritarian
electoral rule for the cantonal government
Lutz and Strohmann (1998)
Term limits gov. Dummy = 1 for cantons having term limits for
governors
Lutz and Strohmann (1998)
Maj. parliament Dummy = 1 for cantons with majoritarian
electoral rule for the cantonal parliament
Lutz and Strohmann (1998)
Term limits parl. Dummy = 1 for cantons having term limits for
members of parliament
Lutz and Strohmann (1998)
Seats parliament Number of seats in the cantonal parliaments anneé politique suisse
Budget rules Dummy = 1 for cantons having a budget rule
for a given year
Own calculations on the basis of
Stauffer (2001)
Budget referendum Dummy = 1 for cantons allowing for manda-
tory budget referendum
Own calculations on the basis of data
from Trechsel and Serdült (1999).
Threshold Quantitative threshold level of a project per
capita required to qualify for ballots
Own calculations on the basis of data
from Trechsel and Serdült (1999).
Grants Real federal grants per capita Own calculations on the basis of the
Swiss Federal Finance and Tax Ad-
ministration
Income Real national income disaggregated to the
cantons per capita
Swiss Federal Finance Administration
Population Cantonal population Swiss Federal Statistical Office
Ratio of urban
population
Proportion of communes having more than
10'000 inhabitants.
Swiss Federal Statistical Office
Communes Number of communes in a canton Swiss Federal Statistical Office
Language Dummy = 1 for German speaking cantons Own investigations
Ideology parl. Share of seat by left-wing parties in the canto-
nal parliament
anneé politique suisse
Ideology gov. Index between 1 (right) to 5 (left) that meas-
ures the relative strength of parties in govern-
ment with reference to the Left-Right dimen-
sion.
Own calculations on the basis of data
from the cantonal governments.
Unemployment Share of unemployment of the cantonal popu-
lation
Own calculations on the basis of
Swiss Federal Statistical Office